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Once the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division hasdismissed an appeal against a conviction, orrefused leave to appeal, it has no further
jurisdiction. The Court itself cannot permit a further
appeal. Nor can any other court cause a case to return to
the Court of Appeal. And the power of the Home
Secretary to refer convictions for a new appeal was
abolished by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.
What that Act did, however, was replace the Home
Secretary’s power by a new independent body, the
Criminal Cases Review Commission, which alone can refer
convictions and sentences back to the Court of Appeal or
the Crown Court (in respect of magistrates’ court
decisions) and the corresponding courts in Northern
Ireland. Once the Commission has referred a case, the
court must hear it.
It was formerly open to the appellant to argue any
grounds he chose, but a recent statutory provision just
brought into effect will limit the appellant to those grounds
on which the Commission has made the reference unless
the court grants permission for other grounds to be added.
The Commission itself has no role to play at this stage. Its
work is complete once the conviction or sentence has been
referred, unless the court asks us to do further work.
The Commission reviews around 900 convictions and
sentences each year. The majority of applications are in
respect of convictions in the Crown Court. There must
normally have been an unsuccessful appeal or application
for leave to appeal before the Commission can consider a
reference unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Likewise, a reference must normally be based on new
evidence or argument unless there are exceptional
circumstances to justify a departure from that
requirement.
The Commission is an independent statutory body
which receives its funding from the Home Office and is
accountable to Parliament through the Home Secretary
and the Home Affairs Committee before which it is
periodically called to give evidence. The Commission is not
subject to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, but is amenable
to judicial review. In exercising its judicial review
jurisdiction, the High Court has acknowledged that
Parliament has entrusted this important responsibility to
the Commission and it is not for the courts to substitute
their view for that of the Commissioners unless we have
strayed outside the legal limits.
The Act requires a minimum of 11 Commissioners, who
are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the
Prime Minister, one-third of whom must be lawyers and
two-thirds of whom must have some familiarity with the
criminal justice system. One Commissioner must have
knowledge of criminal justice in Northern Ireland.
The Act does not stipulate how the Commission should
discharge its duties, except that it does reserve certain
decisions to committees of at least three Commissioners.
Thus, it is only such a committee that can refer a case for
appeal or appoint a police force to carry out inquiries on
its behalf.
The vast majority of cases are, in fact, decided by a single
Commissioner. The Commission has never delegated
decision-making to its staff, who number around 100,
about half of whom are caseworkers. As with the
Commissioners, the caseworkers are not all lawyers. Most
have casework experience in other organisations, such as
trading standards or the police. The Commissioners
themselves bring a range of skills and experience to bear on
the search for miscarriages of justice: the lawyers are drawn
from private practice in both civil and criminal law, the
Crown Prosecution Service, the military and academia; the
non-lawyers include a former local government chief
executive, a former chief constable, a tax accountant, a
consultant forensic psychiatrist and a chief executive from
industry.
Cases are screened on arrival and, if it appears that the
review can be completed within five case-working days
(albeit over a longer period of time), then the case will be
allocated for almost immediate review. Cases that will
require more effort are placed in a queue and allocated in
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order unless prioritised for special reasons such as the
health of the applicant or a crucial witness. These waiting
times are longer than the Commission would like, but
resources are limited.
Staff members carry out the review working in
consultation with one or more Commissioners. The
Commission has formidable powers available to it, notably
the power to obtain any material, document or exhibit in
the possession of any public body. There are no limits: it
extends to PII material, ministerial papers, security service
files, medical records and census returns, for example.
Unfortunately, there is no corresponding power (as there is
in Scotland) to obtain material from private persons or
bodies. Nor does the reach of this provision extend to
Scotland, which can cause complications. Another
difficulty is caused by the fact that the Commission and its
work are not recognised for the purposes of international
mutual co-operation in criminal justice, owing to a
statutory oversight, and this can occasion significant delays.
The Commission is empowered to take whatever steps
are necessary to review a conviction or sentence. This may
take the form of interviewing witnesses, seeking
statements, commissioning expert reports and re-
examining exhibits. The Commission operates in an
inquisitorial fashion and does not normally hold oral
hearings.
The words “miscarriage of justice” do not appear in the
statute. The Commission is not explicitly charged with the
task of ascertaining innocence of guilt. In fact, its role links
to and derives from the approach of the Court of Appeal
itself: is the conviction safe? The concept of safety is, of
course, something that has been developed in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal over many years. The
Commission plays a role in its continued development by
referring cases which may afford the Court an opportunity
to clarify or develop the law.
The test the Commission must apply is to assess whether
there is a real possibility that the conviction (or sentence)
will be overturned. Some 30 or 40 cases a year are found
to satisfy that criterion and are referred, with around 70
per cent resulting in a successful appeal by the appellant.
Real possibility lies somewhere between a bare possibility
on the one hand and a racing certainty on the other, to use
the words of Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ. It is not (as
some have supposed) the same test as applied by the single
judge or full court in deciding applications for leave to
appeal.
Some argue that the Commission is too cautious and it
applies the test incorrectly. That is certainly not the view of
the judges. Our critics insist that the proportion of cases in
which we find that there is no real possibility is far too high
and on some intuitive basis they are convinced that
miscarriages of justice are more common. The
Commission, for its part, performs its task with no
preconceptions or biases, but acts on what it finds in the
course of a review, bearing in mind that there must
normally be some evidence or argument not previously
adduced before a case may be referred. It is not enough for
the Commission merely to think that the jury or the Court
of Appeal may have got it wrong.
Even if a real possibility is found, the Commission is
under no duty to refer the case. It has a discretion whether
to do so or not, although it is a discretion very sparingly
exercised. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a real
possibility of success in the Court of Appeal will make it
right that the case should be heard, but there may be cases
where there is no discernible public or private interest in
making the reference. One such case was that of Timothy
Evans, who was executed for murder in respect of which a
free pardon was subsequently granted and compensation
was paid to members of his family. The Commission could
see no benefit in referring that conviction to the Court
merely for the purpose of formally extinguishing the
conviction (which admittedly a free pardon does not do).
The Commission’s decision was endorsed by the Divisional
Court on judicial review.
Another function of the Commission is to carry out
inquiries at the direction of the Court of Appeal whether
on an appeal or on an application for leave to appeal. A
number of such requests have been made. A role in relation
to offering advice to the Home Secretary on the exercise of
the royal prerogative of mercy has never been utilised.
It is true that the real-possibility-of-quashing test throws
the Commission’s spotlight on matters other than
innocence or guilt. In a number of references, however,
convictions have been shown to be unsafe in circumstances
that leave little doubt that the wrong person was convicted.
In other cases, that may not be so: the error, irregularity or
new evidence may simply mean that the original trial and
result are not sustainable. Along with the Court of Appeal,
we therefore play a role in maintaining the integrity of the
criminal process and ensuring that people do not remain
convicted inappropriately.
Some of the cases we examine are very old. Indeed, in a
few, they are not only old but the convicted person is no
longer alive. It is only where there is a reasonably close
surviving relative that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
in such cases and that requirement imposes some
limitation on the age of cases we are likely to consider, but
close surviving relatives do have a real interest in these
matters and it is right that they should not be excluded
from the process.
With old cases, the question arises of what law should be
applied: is it the law at the time of the trial and first appeal
or the law of today? The basic answer, given by the courts,
is that in the case of statute law, it is the law in force at the
time, but in the case of the common law and standards of
fairness, it is the law of today, though in respect of
standards of fairness, the paramount question remains the
safety of the conviction and not merely any departure from 3
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today’s rules. Whether it is right that the contemporary
law should be applied is an interesting question which
deserves fuller consideration.
The Commission issues its decisions in the form of fully-
reasoned statements of reasons which are made available to
the applicant and, in the case of referrals, also to the court
and the relevant prosecutor. Confidentiality provisions in
the 1995 Act prevent general publication of the statements
by the Commission.
It is sometimes suggested that a different test should be
used, perhaps one that refers to a possible miscarriage of
justice or even to innocence. Another suggestion is that the
final decision should not be made by the relevant appeal
court, but either by the Commission itself or some other
specially-constituted body. Both of these arguments it
seems to me are flawed.
While it would indeed be possible to confine our
attention to something called miscarriages of justice,
provided that term were defined, or even to innocence, it
would give rise to a very unsatisfactory situation where our
work disclosed grounds for concluding that a conviction
was not safe and would not be upheld if it were to come
again before the relevant appeal court but we could take no
action. A miscarriage of justice or innocence test would
greatly circumscribe our remit. If there are areas of law
productive of references in unmeritorious cases – such
perhaps as adverse inferences, provocation or diminished
responsibility – it is likely that what is needed is reform of
the law in question, whether by the Court of Appeal or
Parliament, as appropriate, rather than a restriction of the
Commission’s power.
Removing the final decision from the Court of Appeal
would be a serious mistake, since it would introduce a rival
jurisdiction and would do nothing to lead to
improvements, clarification or consistency in the law.
Indeed, it would do the reverse and exacerbate the
problems.
There is a good relationship between the judges and the
Commission, each respecting the independence and
defined role of the other. It is a tribute to the judiciary that
it operates the machinery of referral so fairly, in the
interests of justice, and we can all take some pride in a
system that means that the door to justice is never closed,
that justice is prized above finality. Our work, both in
making references and refusing to do so, also contributes
to public confidence in the administration of criminal
justice.
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